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ELECTORAL DUE PROCESS 
SARAH MILKOVICH† 
ABSTRACT 
  Elections and their aftermath are matters left to the states by the U.S. 
Constitution. But the Supreme Court has made clear that the right to 
vote is federally protected, and fiercely so. When an election failure 
takes place and deprives citizens of their votes, challengers must resort 
to state law remedies. Many states have procedural requirements for 
election challenges that are stringent to the point of being prohibitive.  
  This Note argues that the due process concerns raised by these 
burdensome state procedures are amplified by their voting rights 
context. Where a voter must take to the courts to vindicate her right to 
vote, she should not be further deprived by an unfair process. Federal 
courts hearing cases about unfair election-challenge procedures have 
been reluctant to interfere and are thus overly deferential to the states.  
  This Note offers a new approach for “electoral due process” 
claims—an approach that is properly preservative of voters’ 
substantive rights and their rights to a fair hearing. 
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At the bottom of all the tributes paid to democracy, is the little 
man, walking into the little booth, with a little pencil, making a 
little cross on a little bit of paper—no amount of rhetoric or 
voluminous discussion can possibly palliate the overwhelming 
importance of that point. 
— Winston Churchill1 
INTRODUCTION 
The 2000 presidential election left Americans reeling and 
uncertain about the integrity of the electoral system. Congress quickly 
passed the Help America Vote Act (“HAVA”).2 In response to the 
hanging chads that loomed large in the national psyche,3 a federal 
solution was presented—federal money was made available to state 
and local governments for election administration updates like 
electronic voting machines.4  HAVA funds and updates were accepted 
by all fifty states, the District of Columbia, American Samoa, Guam, 
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.5 
 
 1. 404 Parl Deb HC (5th ser.) (1944) col. 667 (UK). 
 2. Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified in scattered 
sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 3. Senator Kit Bond described the effect the 2000 presidential election had on the nation:  
The 2000 election opened the eyes of many Americans to the flaws and failures of our 
election machinery, our voting systems, and even how we determine what a vote is . . . . 
We learned of hanging chads and inactive lists. . . . We learned of legal voters turned 
away, while dead voters cast ballots. We discovered that many people voted twice, 
while too many weren’t even counted once . . . . This . . . bill . . . tries to address each of 
the fundamental problems we have discovered. 
148 CONG. REC. S10,488–02 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2002) (statement of Sen. Bond). 
 4. See 52 U.S.C. § 20901(a), (b)(1)(C), (b)(1)(F) (2012) (providing funding for “educating 
voters concerning . . . voting technology” and “[i]mproving, acquiring, . . . or replacing voting 
systems and technology and methods for casting and counting votes”). Crafting HAVA was a 
delicate matter because the Constitution leaves the “[m]anner of holding Elections” to the states. 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. This plenary grant of power to the states restricts meddling by the 
federal government. Congress may condition federal funds on state performance of objectives 
that are not within Congress’s enumerated powers, as long as those objectives are “in pursuit of 
the general welfare,” South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (internal quotation marks 
omitted), and the offered funds do not operate as a compulsion, id. at 211. HAVA is an allowed 
vehicle for Congress to use to facilitate election technology updates because the offered federal 
funds—and the attached election administration changes—were voluntary for the states. See 
Jennifer Nou, Privatizing Democracy: Promoting Election Integrity Through Procurement 
Contracts, 118 YALE L.J. 744, 781–82 (“Under the Spending Clause, conditional grants like 
HAVA merely create incentives rather than coercive pronouncements for states and thus do not 
constitute unconstitutional intrusions into state sovereignty.”). 
 5. See U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, ANNUAL GRANT EXPENDITURE REPORT: 
FISCAL YEAR 2015, at 2 (Mar. 2016), https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/28/Final%20FY%202015
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During the 2016 election, all states but three used electronic voting 
machines.6 Every state also now uses electronic voter-registration 
databases, which are accessed on Election Day to verify the eligibility 
of each voter who comes to the polls.7 These updates work to prevent 
the election failures of an earlier era—those of faulty hole punching, of 
eligible voters turned away by poll workers, and of accidental over- or 
undervoting.8  
During the 2016 election cycle, however, this new technology 
fomented a new breed of concerns: tampered-with electronic voting 
machines; the inadvertent misprogramming of electronic voting 
machine software; and remote interference with voter registration 
databases.9 Hackers working from Russia “hit” the electronic election 
systems in thirty-nine states during the 2016 primaries and general 
election.10 At least “a handful of states” experienced interference with 
election administration during this cybersecurity attack, but there is 
very little information about the extent to which these hits impacted 
Election Day.11 In July 2018, Special Counsel Robert Mueller secured 
 
%20Grants%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/LT4B-LWAL] (reporting that as of September 30, 
2015, $3,247,294,645 has been given to these jurisdictions under HAVA). 
 6. See Drew Desilver, On Election Day, Most Voters Use Electronic or Optical-Scan Ballots, 
PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 8, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/08/on-election-day-
most-voters-use-electronic-or-optical-scan-ballots/ [https://perma.cc/6H4U-6LZ9] (reporting that 
Washington, Oregon, and Colorado conduct all voting by mail, while the other forty-seven states 
use at least some optical-scan voting and direct-recording electronic voting machines). 
 7. See VRM in the States: Electronic Registration, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Feb. 3, 
2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/vrm-states-electronic-registration [https://
perma.cc/V67R-R2JM] (“Thanks to . . . the Help America Vote Act, every state now has (or soon 
will have) a computerized statewide voter registration database capable of sharing information in 
some form with other government databases.”). 
 8. See 148 CONG. REC. S10,488–02, supra note 3 (referring to these election problems as 
the motivation for HAVA). 
 9. See, e.g., Brian Barrett, America’s Electronic Voting Machines are Scarily Easy Targets, 
WIRED (Aug. 2, 2016, 9:57 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/08/americas-voting-machines-
arent-ready-election/ [https://perma.cc/8E7J-PM25] (“[R]esearchers have demonstrated that 
many [electronic voting systems] are susceptible to malware or, equally if not more alarming, a 
well-timed denial of service attack.”). 
 10. Michael Riley & Jordan Robertson, Russian Cyber Hacks on U.S. Electoral System Far 
Wider than Previously Known, BLOOMBERG (June 13, 2017, 5:00 AM), https:// 
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-13/russian-breach-of-39-states-threatens-future-u-s-
elections [https://perma.cc/2QAT-B4E5]. 
 11. See Sari Horwitz, Ellen Nakashima & Matea Gold, DHS Tells States About Russian 
Hacking During 2016 Election, WASH. POST (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/dhs-tells-states-about-russian-hacking-during-2016-election/2017/09/22/
fd263a2c-9fe2-11e7-8ea1-ed975285475e_story.html [https://perma.cc/G5FX-6FYQ] (reporting 
that “the hackers seemed to be looking for vulnerabilities”). 
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indictments against twelve Russian intelligence agents for charges 
related to “large-scale cyber operations [conducted] to interfere with 
the 2016 U.S. presidential election.”12 The 2017 French presidential 
election also suffered an “infrastructure” attack from Russian 
hackers.13 And the 20018 midterm elections were no different. By the 
end of Election Day, civil rights organizations had reported at least 
29,000 voting irregularities across the country.14 In Georgia, North 
Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Texas, machines are said to have flipped 
voters’ choices.15 In New York City, so many voting machines began 
malfunctioning that one organization created a map of affected polling 
places.16 In one Georgia county, five different polling places 
experienced voting machine failure; remaining voters used provisional 
ballots, but it is not yet clear whether votes cast on those machines 
earlier in the day were preserved.17 
 
 12. Indictment, United States v. Netyksho, No. 1:18CR00215, 2018 WL 3407381 (D.D.C. July 
13, 2018).  
 13. See Andy Greenberg, The NSA Confirms It: Russia Hacked French Election 
‘Infrastructure’, WIRED (May 9, 2017, 12:36 PM), https://www.wired.com/2017/05/nsa-director-
confirms-russia-hacked-french-election-infrastructure/ [https://perma.cc/K4WS-4HWH] 
(reporting that the nature of the “infrastructure” attack has not been clearly revealed by the 
French government, but that the En Marche political party has described the attack as “a massive, 
coordinated act of hacking”). 
 14. Amy Gardner & Beth Reinhard, Broken Machines, Rejected Ballots and Long Lines: 




 15. See id. (“Complaints also emerged about voting machines flipping voters’ choices in 
Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Texas and Illinois.”); John Bowden, Voters Report Texas Voting 
Machines Changing Straight-Party Selections, HILL (Oct. 26, 2018, 11:27 AM), 
https://thehill.com/policy/technology/413320-voters-report-texas-voting-machines-changing-
straight-party-selections [https://perma.cc/CE2Z-BPZ9] (reporting this problem in Texas and 
Georgia). 
 16. Courtney Norris, Nsikan Akpan & Joshua Barajas, Which States Were Hit by Voting 
Problems on Election Day?, PBS NEWS HOUR (Nov. 6, 218, 6:44 PM), 
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/which-states-were-hit-by-voting-problems-on-election-
day [https://perma.cc/B7MB-W7U3] (reporting voting machine problems in New York City and 
including a link to the map showing voting machine outages). The map represents each voting 
machine failure as a dot. Erica Anderson, NYCity News Serv., Jenny Ye, Quartz, Spenser Metsel, 
Ally J. Levine & Sisi Wei, ProPublica, Breakdown in New York City, PROPUBLICA: 
ELECTIONLAND (Nov. 8, 2018, 10:300 AM), https://projects.propublica.org/graphics/election-
2018-broken-machines [https://perma.cc/543L-SUVV]. 
 17. Gardner & Reinhard, supra note 14. All of this is to say nothing of the fact that Georgia 
Secretary of State Brian Kemp administered the very election in which he was running for 
governor; Kemp’s administration of the election, including an eleventh-hour “investigation” 
launched into Georgia Democrats, which suggested “without evidence” that they “tr[ied] to hack 
the state’s voter registration files,” has been the subject of significant criticism. Richard Fausset 
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These recent breaches have claimed the spotlight, but post-
HAVA election failures are not new. In 2008, electronic voting 
machines were improperly programmed for the congressional primary 
in Louisiana.18 At least 2167—and likely 5000—independent voters 
were prevented from casting Democratic votes, even though they were 
explicitly allowed to do so by state law.19 The margin in that primary 
was 1484 votes.20 In 2012, at least one polling station in Virginia had an 
electronic voting machine with faulty programming.21 The machine had 
to be decommissioned on Election Day because votes cast for 
President Barack Obama were being tallied for Governor Mitt 
Romney.22 Virginia experienced election failures again during the 2014 
midterm elections, when “thirty-two electronic voting machines at 
twenty-five polling places” stopped functioning properly.23 The entire 
Texas voter-registration system crashed during the 2014 midterm 
 
& Alan Blinder, Brian Kemp’s Office, Without Citing Evidence, Investigates Georgia Democrats 
Over Alleged Hack, N.Y. Times (Nov. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/04/us/politics/
georgia-elections-kemp-voters-hack.html [https://perma.cc/LW8H-9Z8F]; Nicquel Terry Ellis, 
Will Georgia Voting Controversies Discourage Voters from Turning Out?, USA TODAY (Nov. 2, 
2018, 11:27 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2018/11/02/midterms-
stacey-abrams-brian-kemp-voter-suppression-controversy-minority-turnout/18007527002 
[https://perma.cc/7BLA-FYS8]. 
 18. See Andrew Appel, Independent Voters Disenfranchised in Louisiana, FREEDOM TO 
TINKER (Oct. 19, 2008), https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2008/10/19/independent-voters-
disenfranchised-louisiana/ [https://perma.cc/F3UK-VDXD] (“[W]hen Independent voters 
pressed the button on the voting machine for a candidate in the Democratic congressional 
primary, nothing happened. In effect, these voters said that they were prevented from voting in 
the Democratic Congressional primary.”). My father was a candidate in this race, and I worked 
on his campaign. He unsuccessfully filed suit to challenge the election on the basis of the 
electronic voting machine irregularities. 
 19. See id. (reporting that the Sequoia AVC Advantage version 9.00H direct-recording 
electronic voting machines used in the election improperly “locked out” independent voters, 
preventing them from casting a ballot). 
 20. Id. 
 21. See James Orr, US Election 2012: Voting Machine “Changes Vote for Barack Obama to 
Mitt Romney,” TELEGRAPH (Nov. 6, 2012, 9:05 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/worldnews/us-election/9659694/US-election-2012-voting-machine-changes-vote-for-
Barack-Obama-to-Mitt-Romney.html [https://perma.cc/GJ7F-7YPT] (“An electronic voting 
machine was taken out of service on Tuesday after being captured on video changing a vote for 
President Barack Obama into one for Mitt Romney.”). 
 22. Id. Similar vote flipping was reported in 2012 for electronic voting machines in Nevada, 
Texas, North Carolina, and Ohio. Mark Clayton, Voting-Machine Glitches: How Bad Was It on 
Election Day Around the Country?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Nov. 7, 2012), 
https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Elections/2012/1107/Voting-machine-glitches-How-bad-was-it-
on-Election-Day-around-the-country [https://perma.cc/PWE2-KT8E]. 
 23. Pippa Norris, Why American Elections are Flawed (And How to Fix Them) 9 (Harvard 
Kennedy Sch., Working Paper No. RWP16-038, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2844793 
[https://perma.cc/WT9X-HZPT].  
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election, forcing many to choose between forfeiting their vote 
altogether and taking the extra time to cast a provisional ballot.24  
Computer science professors at Princeton, Johns Hopkins, U.C. 
Berkeley, U.C. Davis, and the University of Michigan have attested to 
the ease with which they—or any programmer—could tamper with 
voting machine software.25 One boasted a personal best of complete 
software reprogramming in under a minute.26  
How is this new generation of election threats to be addressed? 
More federal funding could encourage states to opt for newer 
technology. It seems, however, that no security measure could 
completely prevent meddling. In 2017 alone, even the best-protected 
organizations, from the NSA and the CIA to Deloitte and Merck, were 
brought to their knees.27 If even the entities with the very best 
cybersecurity are suffering breaches, the same should be expected in 
the election process. In a time of such sophisticated threats to the 
integrity of our electoral process, preventive measures alone are not 
enough. Congressional researchers released a report in 2016 that 
 
 24. Id. (citation omitted).  
 25. See David L. Dill, Our Voting System Is Hackable by Foreign Powers, SCI. AM. (Mar. 1, 
2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/our-voting-system-is-hackable-by-foreign-
powers/ [https://perma.cc/BK82-6C2X] (“[P]rofessor J. Alex Halderman says that he and his 
students could have changed the result of the November [2016] election . . . and there are videos 
to prove it.”); Andrea Foster, Computer Scientists Hack into Voting Machines, CHRON. OF 
HIGHER EDUC.: WIRED CAMPUS (July 30, 2007), https://www.chronicle.com/blogs/wiredcampus/
computer-scientists-hack-into-voting-machines/3217 [https://perma.cc/PDB2-LFY8] (reporting 
that in a study commissioned by the California Secretary of State, the U.C. professors “hack[ed] 
into electronic voting machines from three manufacturers”); Daniel Turner, How to Hack an 
Election in One Minute, MIT TECH. REV. (Sept. 18, 2006), https://www.technologyreview.com/
s/406525/how-to-hack-an-election-in-one-minute/ [https://perma.cc/NV5N-6FFF] (reporting that 
with “$12 worth of tools,” the team “show[ed] exactly how entire voting systems could be not just 
rendered inoperable, but deliberately hacked to rig an election”). 
 26. See Chris Newmarker, Princeton Prof Hacks E-Vote Machine, WASH. POST (Sept.  
13, 2006, 6:42 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/13/
AR2006071300989.html [https://perma.cc/BRN9-A52U] (“One member of the group was able to 
pick the lock in 10 seconds, and software could be installed in less than a minute . . . .”). 
 27. See Lily Hay Newman, The Biggest Cybersecurity Disasters of 2017 So Far, WIRED (July 
1, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/2017-biggest-hacks-so-far/ [https://perma.cc/ 
99DS-QW7q] (reporting the breaches suffered by the NSA, the United Kingdom’s National 
Health Service, U.S. pharmaceutical giant Merck, and the CIA’s “Vault 7” data trove); Zack 
Whittaker, These Were 2017’s Biggest Hacks, Leaks, and Data Breaches, ZDNET (Dec. 18, 2017, 
8:21 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/pictures/biggest-hacks-leaks-and-data-breaches-2017/ [https://
perma.cc/SSG6-FPWD] (reporting the breaches suffered by the TSA; the U.S. Air Force; 
Deloitte, one of the “Big Four” accounting, tax, and audit corporations; Verizon; Equifax; Bell 
Canada, Canada’s largest telecommunications company; Virgin America; Oxford University; 
Cambridge University; and New York University).  
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stated, “Cybersecurity experts [recognize] that preventive measures 
are insufficient by themselves” to prevent a cyberattack on American 
elections because “an adversary with enough motivation, resources, 
and expertise, such as a nation-state, can often overcome” such security 
measures.28 What is required, then, is a new remedial framework. 
Remedies for election failures are a matter of state law. Just as 
Election Day policies and voter registration processes are left to the 
states,29 so too are the procedures for challenging election practices and 
election results.30 Each state has its own guidelines for alleging that an 
election was defective or wanting in some way, for investigating the 
election structure and results, and for remedying any identified error.31 
While each state has developed a unique election-challenge process,32 
the majority are structured to restrict the number of challenges, to 
impose short timelines on election challengers, and to minimize the 
number of challenges that ultimately succeed.33 These measures serve 
the admittedly important state interest of having a settled victor take 
office in time—a victor untainted by doubts in the process by which she 
was selected.34 However, at a certain point, such procedures burden 
 
 28. ARTHUR L. BURRIS & ERIC A. FISCHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE HELP 
AMERICA VOTE ACT AND ELECTION ADMINISTRATION: OVERVIEW AND SELECTED ISSUES 
FOR THE 2016 ELECTION 17 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS20898.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6ECK-PLQN]. 
 29. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding elections . . . 
shall be prescribed in each State . . . .”). Only boundaries set by other provisions of the 
Constitution can limit the states’ garde of elections. The Fifteenth Amendment, for instance, 
provides that neither race nor color nor “previous condition of servitude” may be used to deny 
or abridge a citizen’s right to vote. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. The Supreme Court also 
explained, “States may not casually deprive a class of individuals of the vote because of some 
remote administrative benefit to the State.” Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965). Such a 
deprivation, the Court said, would “impose[] an invidious discrimination in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. 
 30. See Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065, 1077 (1st Cir. 1978) (“[T]he Constitution confers 
upon the states the ‘power to control the disposition of contests over elections to . . . state and 
local offices.’” (citation omitted)). 
 31. See infra Part I. 
 32. These election challenges are often referred to as “election contests” in state statutes, 
case law, and scholarship.  
 33. See infra Part I. 
 34. See, e.g., Joshua A. Douglas, Discouraging Election Contests, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 1015, 
1024 (2013) (“The system craves finality, particularly on election night . . . . A contested election 
undermines the notion that the winner has an electoral mandate.”) [hereinafter Douglas, 
Discouraging Election Contests]. 
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voters’35 constitutional rights.36 Federal courts have, at times, stepped 
in to require states to adjust their challenge procedures to be less 
burdensome on challengers. The standard for reviewing these 
procedures, however, has been deferential to the states, and rare has 
been the successful challenge.37  
This Note argues that state procedural rules should be reformed 
to allow litigants to more easily discover the extent of election failures 
and to prove their impact on election outcomes. Federal courts should 
propel these changes by adopting more exacting legal standards for 
“electoral due process” claims—that is, claims that involve the 
sufficiency and fairness of procedures for challenging elections. By 
demanding more from these state procedural frameworks, federal 
courts could protect our uniquely decentralized American electoral 
process38 from the impact of modern threats and protect the 
constitutional rights of voters—all with minimal federal judicial 
encroachment into the “political thicket.”39 
Part I of this Note provides an overview of states’ procedural 
frameworks for challenging elections. Part II lays out a brief history of 
federal courts’ treatment of election questions, highlighting the 
uniqueness and centrality of the right to vote. Part III proposes a new 
approach for electoral due process cases. This approach would demand 
more of state procedures for election challenges—a change that is 
newly imperative in an age of unprecedented election interference 
threats. 
I.  SURVEY OF STATE PROCEDURES FOR ELECTION CHALLENGES 
States require much of litigants who wish to challenge election 
results. Short deadlines, expensive filing fees, and summary 
proceedings make it more difficult for challengers to be heard on the 
 
 35. This Note discusses the rights of voters, but the rights of candidates are conceptually the 
same in this context. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972) (“The rights of voters and the 
rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation; laws that affect candidates always 
have at least some theoretical, correlative effect on voters.”). 
 36. See infra Part II.B. 
 37. Douglas, Discouraging Election Contests, supra note 34, at 1017 (“[T]here have been no 
successful election contests for federal office (either House of Congress or President) or governor 
in recent memory.” (citations omitted)). 
 38. See Norris, supra note 23, at 7 (referring to the “decentralized nature of [the] US electoral 
administration” in which there are 8000 separate jurisdictions responsible for election 
administration and security). 
 39. Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1123 (2016) (quoting Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 
549, 556 (1946)). 
MILKOVICH IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/26/2018  4:57 PM 
2018] ELECTORAL DUE PROCESS 603 
merits of their claims—and much more difficult for them to succeed. 
Some scholars urge states to impose additional burdens. For example, 
sore-loser laws would punish candidates who challenge results “by 
restricting their future ballot access or giving these candidates a 
disfavored ballot placement in a subsequent election,” or by 
“requir[ing] that the candidate’s advertisements in the next election 
include a disclaimer.”40 
In addition to these procedural burdens, which are discussed more 
fully below, some states hinder litigants from even learning about 
election failures. For instance, “standard operating procedures” in 
Georgia led state workers to wipe electronic voting machine data from 
servers in 2017, just after the filing of a lawsuit that concerned the 
machines’ poor performance.41 Though policies like these are not 
formal rules, they impact a challenger’s ability to gather evidence that 
is crucial for making a case about election failures. 
No matter the improbability of navigating these rules, a litigant 
cannot completely evade eccentric challenge procedures by instead 
filing suit in federal court.42 Concerns over election administration, as 
a matter left to the states, must first be adjudicated according to state-
provided procedural vehicles. Only once available state remedies are 
exhausted may a litigant raise constitutional election-failure claims in 
federal district court. 
 
 40. Douglas, Discouraging Election Contests, supra note 34, at 1018. Private litigants who 
bring election challenges are more incentivized to bring meritorious claims than spurious claims. 
As the name for sore-loser laws suggests, candidates face considerable ignominy for bringing an 
election challenge. They are vulnerable to portrayal as refusing to accept defeat graciously. A 
candidate willing to become an election challenger is a candidate who is willing to forfeit future 
political aspirations if her challenge is revealed to be baseless. An organization or political party 
willing to support a voter in bringing an election challenge would be subject to similar criticisms. 
Whether party or candidate, the challenger would have to grapple with the potential shame of 
losing publicly a second time. Further, any candidate or party that is so unmoored as to be 
unchecked by that chastening concern is likely a candidate or party that is so on the fringe that 
the public would not even credit their claims of election failure or follow the litigation. In such a 
case, the public would accept the originally announced results as final and consider any ongoing 
litigation nothing more than an inevitable confirmation of those results. Finally, the legal system 
has a number of safeguards against spurious and manipulative claims, including sanctions, swift 
dismissals, and counterclaims. Those ordinary safeguards are sufficient without the imposition of 
prohibitive, election-specific procedures. 
 41. See Frank Bajak, Georgia Election Server Wiped After Suit Filed, AP NEWS (Oct. 27, 
2017), https://apnews.com/877ee1015f1c43f1965f63538b035d3f [https://perma.cc/6FV3-MF68] 
(reporting that a server was wiped just after a “security expert disclosed a gaping security hole,” 
and that “[t]he server data could have revealed whether Georgia’s most recent elections were 
compromised by hackers”). 
 42. See infra Part II.C. 
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A. Shortened Deadlines and Expensive Fees 
Understandably, states generally require that an election 
challenge be filed promptly after Election Day. If challenges were 
allowed indefinitely, legitimate challenges might not be brought until 
deep into the allegedly wrongful victor’s tenure of service. A greatly 
delayed revelation of mistaken election results would undermine the 
legitimacy of governance. Voters and legal systems would have to 
reckon with relics of the invalid exercise of public office: the 
prosecutorial choices of improperly elected district attorneys, the 
swing votes of improperly elected legislators, and the common law 
making of improperly elected state supreme court judges. A state’s 
interest in the timely resolution of any doubts as to the integrity of an 
election is clear.43  
However, some states require the filing of petitions challenging 
elections almost immediately after an election—long before the victor 
would be inaugurated. For example, Maryland gubernatorial primary 
elections may only be challenged within three days of the results being 
certified.44 In South Carolina, elections may only be challenged “not 
later than noon five days” after the state board has canvassed votes.45 
Florida and Alaska both require that any challenge be filed within ten 
days of that election’s certification.46 Virginia, too, requires that a 
complaint challenging a primary or special election be filed within ten 
days of Election Day.47  
Some states also require that any appeal concerning an election 
challenge also be filed within a very short time period. For example, in 
North Carolina, an “election protest” must be filed by the second 
business day after the board of elections has declared the results,48 and 
a challenger must appeal a dismissal of her protest within ten days of 
the decision.49 
 
 43. Professor Joshua A. Douglas champions this interest in swiftness and repose: “Strict 
deadlines help to promote quick finality, which is good for the legitimacy of the eventual winner 
and the process itself.” Joshua A. Douglas, Procedural Fairness in Election Contests, 88 IND. L.J. 
1, 46. [hereinafter Douglas, Procedural Fairness]. 
 44. MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 12-202(b)(2) (2018). 
 45. S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-17-260 (2018). 
 46. ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 15.20.540, .550 (2018); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168(1), (2) (2018). 
 47. VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-808 (2018). 
 48. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163A-1177(b)(4)a–c (2018). 
 49. Id. § 163A-1183(b).  
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In New Hampshire, the only remedy available for election 
challengers is an application for a recount.50 Candidates must file this 
application by the Friday following the election.51 All recent New 
Hampshire elections have fallen on Tuesdays.52 Candidates are 
therefore only allotted three days to discover a potential election 
failure, decide whether to challenge the election on that ground, gather 
enough evidence to do so, and prepare an application. If that 
application is denied, a challenger must appeal to another New 
Hampshire commission within three days.53 If that commission’s review 
is also unfavorable, the challenger must then appeal to the state 
supreme court within five days.54 
In addition, some states employ much more expensive filing fees 
for election challenges than for other actions. Virginia charges the 
challenger as much as $100 per challenged precinct,55 putting a 
statewide election challenge at a cost of over $270,000.56 Alabama 
requires $5,000 upon the filing of an election challenge as an upfront 
court cost.57 When a challenger alleges election fraud in Oklahoma, she 
must pay $5,000 per county allegedly affected.58 Therefore, alleging 
statewide election fraud in Oklahoma costs $385,000. 
 
 50. See JACK MASKELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LEGAL PROCESSES FOR CONTESTING 
THE RESULTS OF A PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 4 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44659.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GH8F-YUNG] (“New Hampshire law does not appear to provide a specific 
statutory scheme for election contests relating to federal elections, but rather provides for a 
process for a recount and an appeal and hearing on such recount results.”). 
 51. Id. (citation omitted). 
 52. See N.H. SEC’Y OF STATE, 2018-2019 POLITICAL CALENDAR 1, http://sos.nh.gov/
WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=8589972718 [https://perma.cc/LG2C-HSNA] (listing the 
dates for elections in 2018 and 2019). 
 53. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 665:8 (2018). 
 54. Id. § 665:16. 
 55. VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-803(B) (2018). 
 56. See 2016 Presidential General Election Precinct Results, VA. DEP’T OF ELECTIONS, 
http://historical.elections.virginia.gov/elections/view/80871/ [https://perma.cc/B3P2-DJUM] 
(follow the “Download this Election” hyperlink, then follow the “Precinct Results” hyperlink) 
(listing a total of over 2700 precincts in Virginia).  
 57. ALA. CODE. § 17-16-63 (2017). In contrast, filing fees for other types of civil claims in 
Alabama state court do not exceed $1297 for civil cases. See id. § 12-19-71. 
 58. OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 8-119 (2018). Filing suit in other kinds of civil cases costs, at most, 
$232.14 in Oklahoma state court. Id. tit. 28, § 152.  
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B. Extrajudicial Adjudication, Summary Proceedings, and Lack of 
Appellate Process 
Some states provide that an election challenger may not be heard 
in the state’s judicial system at all. These states instead relegate 
determination of election challenges to an administrative agency or to 
a commission of executive officials and legislators. Even of those states 
that do allow challengers access to the state court system, some require 
that the proceedings be conducted in a summary manner. 
In Colorado, state courts “hear and determine [election 
challenges] in a summary manner,” and there is no jury.59 In Kansas, a 
trial judge serves as factfinder over state legislative election challenges 
and then delivers her findings to the Legislature.60 The Legislature, as 
a whole, chooses a winner.61 Neither the trial judge’s findings nor the 
Legislature’s decisions are appealable.62 Challengers of elections in 
New Hampshire must apply to the Secretary of State for a recount.63 
The Secretary’s decision may be appealed, but only to the state’s Ballot 
Law Commission.64 Only on appeal from that decision is the challenger 
finally heard in court.65 Virginia election challenges are held “before a 
special judicial panel” without a jury.66 Depending on the size of an 
election, a North Carolina election challenger must either file her 
challenge with the county board of elections or with the State Board of 
Elections.67 County board decisions must be reviewed by the State 
 
 59. COLO. R. CIV. P. 100(b). 
 60. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-1451(a) (2018). 
 61. Id. § 25-1451(b). 
 62. See id. § 25-1450 (stating that “contests involving the office of state senator or 
representative” are not appealable). 
 63. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 660:5 (2018). 
 64. Id. § 665:8. 
 65. See id. § 665:16 (“There may be an appeal to the supreme court from the decisions of the 
ballot law commission . . . .”).  
 66. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 24.2-805, -810 (2018). 
 67. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163A-1177 (2018) (“A protest concerning the conduct of an 
election may be filed with the county board of elections . . . .”); id. § 163A-1178(d)(2)d (requiring 
that the county board order the protest and that the county board’s decision be sent to the State 
Board if the county board determines that “[t]here is substantial evidence to believe that a 
violation of the election law or other irregularity or misconduct did occur, and might have affected 
the outcome of the election, but [that] the board is unable to finally determine the effect because 
the election was a multicounty election”); id. § 163A-1180 (“The State Board may consider 
protests that were not filed in compliance with [§ 163A-1177].”).  
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Board of Elections.68 Only then may State Board decisions be appealed 
in state court.69  
Professor Joshua A. Douglas attests that “[b]y far, the most 
common mechanism states use for resolving contests for state house 
and senate seats is to leave the matter to each respective house in the 
legislature.”70 In addition, he says that thirteen states require the 
legislature to decide gubernatorial and lieutenant gubernatorial 
election challenges.71 In these states, the decision of the legislature is 
the first and final adjudication of the challenge, as no appeals are 
allowed.72 And in three states, special legislative committees decide 
executive election challenges.73 
C. Confluence of Multiple Procedural Barriers 
The concurrence of even two of the above procedural 
mechanisms74 amplifies the risk of unfairness to election challengers. 
And it is not uncommon for states to adopt multiple procedural 
barriers.75 Louisiana’s statutory scheme, in particular, has many 
components that work together to inhibit election challenges, including 
short deadlines, summary proceedings, and narrow discovery. While 
any one of these barriers alone could be prohibitive enough to thwart 
a meritorious challenge, the stacking of these barriers, and the 
interactions between them, compounds the difficulty for challengers.  
 
 68. See id. § 163A-1180 (“The State Board may . . . intervene and take jurisdiction over 
protests pending before a county board . . . .”). 
 69. Id. § 163A-1183(b).  
 70. Douglas, Procedural Fairness, supra note 43, at 5.  
 71. Id. at 12, n.72 (citations omitted). 
 72. See id. at 12 (“In these states there is no possibility of appeal; the legislature has the final 
say in who won the election.”).  
 73. Id. at 13 (citations omitted).  
 74. There are, of course, more types of procedural barriers to election challenges. For 
example, Maryland requires challengers to meet a clear and convincing standard. MD. CODE 
ANN., ELEC. LAW § 12-204(d) (2018). And New Hampshire does not allow election actions to be 
brought unless the initial vote count resulted in a slim margin between the top two candidates. 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 660:1, :7 (2018). The greater the margin between the candidates, the 
more a litigant must pay to challenge the election. Id. § 660:2. 
 75. Even in the limited survey provided here, several states employ multiple procedural 
barriers to election challenges. See, e.g., supra note 44 and accompanying text (Maryland); supra 
note 46 and accompanying text (Alaska); supra notes 47, 55–56, 66 and accompanying text 
(Virginia); supra notes 48–49, 67–69 and accompanying text (North Carolina); supra notes 50–54, 
63–65 and accompanying text (New Hampshire); supra note 57 and accompanying text 
(Alabama); infra notes 117–21 and accompanying text (Alabama); infra note 87 and 
accompanying text (Louisiana). 
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In Louisiana, a candidate must file her election challenge “not 
later than 4:30 p.m. of the ninth day after the date of the election.”76 
The challenger must be able to present her case within four days of 
filing suit.77 That proceeding is “tried summarily, without a jury.”78 
Summary proceedings in Louisiana, as in many other states, are to be 
“conducted with rapidity.”79 In Louisiana, judges may choose to hear 
the challenge entirely “in chambers,” rather than having the case “be 
tried in open court.”80 If the challenger wishes to appeal the decision 
reached through this summary process, she has twenty-four hours to 
appeal the decision.81 She then has no more than five days before that 
appellate hearing.82 After the appellate decision is rendered, a 
challenger has forty-eight hours to file an appeal to the Supreme Court 
of Louisiana.83 
Louisiana’s narrow discovery rules for election challenges require 
that a litigant make an initial showing before she is able to conduct any 
discovery.84 A litigant must file a sworn affidavit of a poll watcher or 
election official who has personally witnessed an election irregularity.85 
Candidates who are underfunded and understaffed often lack poll 
watchers on election days, so for many challengers, an affidavit from a 
state employee is the only way forward. The pressures of local politics 
make it unlikely that a public official would go on the record to 
challenge the integrity of the electoral process86—whether or not the 
affidavit assigns any blame for the election failure. An assemblage of 
voters might come forward, willing to testify about the electronic 
voting machine failures they experienced, but none of those voters can 
 
 76. LA. STAT. ANN. § 18:1405(B) (2018). 
 77. Id. § 18:1409(A)(1) (2012). 
 78. Id. 
 79. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 2591 (2018). 
 80. Id. art. 2595. 
 81. LA. STAT. ANN. § 18:1409(D). 
 82. Id. (D)–(F). 
 83. Id. (G). 
 84. Id. § 18:1415(C) (2018). 
 85. Id.  
 86. See Dana Chisnell & Whitney Quesenbery, CTR. FOR CIVIC DESIGN, SECURITY 
INSIGHTS AND ISSUES FOR POLL WORKERS 15 (2014), https://civicdesign.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/09/Pollworkers-and-security-2014-1018c.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2QQ-
Z7F2] (“Relationships outside the polling place may make it easier [for poll workers] to conspire, 
or to let things go that should be checked and/or corrected.”). 
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themselves trigger discovery rights for the challenger, nor can they 
compel election officials to corroborate those voting experiences.87 
Assuming that an election challenger is able to find a statutorily 
qualified state employee to attest to an Election Day malfunction, the 
discovery process triggered by that affidavit is still remarkably 
constrained.88 Depositions are limited to election officials and their 
employees.89 The challenger must wait until the standard time for 
ballot opening—three days after the election90—before she can gain 
access to the evidence therein.91 This limits all meaningful, data-based 
discovery to a six-day window because no further discovery is allowed 
after the challenge has been filed.92 These constraints leave challengers 
potentially unable to pinpoint exactly what caused the broken Election 
Day experiences of voters who come forward to report malfunctions. 
An election challenger is not allowed to seek a rehearing or new trial 
on the matter,93 so her opportunities to add new evidence—even 
evidence that was previously unknown or unattainable—are 
nonexistent, unless the court “upon its own motion” decides to correct 
“manifest error.”94  
It is not difficult to imagine that challenging an election under this 
set of rules would often be futile, even if the challenger’s allegations 
are grounded in an actual election malfunction or breach. Perhaps the 
only challengers who would be able to successfully navigate these 
requirements—an accelerated schedule, little access to election data, 
and reliance on either scarce poll watchers or the corroboration of state 
employees—are those already embedded in local political networks.  
 
 87. See § 18:1415(C) (listing only poll watchers, election commissioners, and election officials 
as those whose affidavit can trigger discovery rights for an election challenger). 
 88. Id. § 18:1415(D). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. § 18:573(A)(1) (“The voting machines . . . shall remain locked or otherwise secured 
and . . . sealed until the third day after the election . . . .”). This subsection also provides that this 
three-day waiting period could be shortened in the event of judicial intervention; however, the 
clear language of § 18:1415(D) seems to foreclose such a court order in the context of an election 
challenge. 
 91. Id. § 18:1405(B); § 18:1415(A), (D), (F) (providing, together, that discovery must occur 
between the third day after the election—the opening of the voting machines—and the ninth day 
after the election—the filing deadline). 
 92. Id. § 18:1415(F). 
 93. Id. § 18:1409(I). 
 94. Id. 
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II.  FEDERAL JURISPRUDENCE ON ELECTION LAW 
Federal courts have historically avoided becoming embroiled in 
election disputes, matters which are both political in nature and 
generally left to the states. However, during the civil rights movement, 
the Supreme Court became more involved in enunciating the 
constitutional requirements states must uphold in administering 
elections. More recently, the Court has shown itself willing even to rule 
on the details of Election Day. This Part provides a historical 
background of federal involvement in elections; it describes the unique 
status of the right to vote, a first among constitutional equals; and it 
explores the current jurisprudence on procedural due process claims in 
the context of election challenges. In particular, while the Supreme 
Court has become more willing to intervene to protect the right to vote, 
the courts of appeals have remained aloof. They turn a blind eye when 
unfair state procedures make it difficult—or impossible—for 
challengers to prove and remedy election failures. 
A. Elections and Federalism 
The U.S. Constitution expressly leaves elections—even elections 
for federal office—within the realm of state control, subject only to 
limited federal interference: “The Times, Places and Manner of 
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be 
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof . . . .”95  The 
Seventeenth Amendment reaffirms this designation of power, stating, 
“The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for 
electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.”96 
The Supreme Court has historically been leery of intruding upon 
state control over elections.97 Cases about elections fall at the 
intersection of two fields the Court sparingly enters. First, the Court is 
generally hesitant to upset separation-of-powers principles by 
answering questions properly left to the “political branches” of the 
 
 95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; see also id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“The House of Representatives 
shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and 
the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most 
numerous Branch of the State Legislature.”); Hugh M. Lee, An Analysis of State and Federal 
Remedies for Election Fraud, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 159, 164 (2001) (explaining that even for 
presidential elections, federal law makes limited intrusions into the states’ selection of electors). 
 96. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. 
 97. See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552 (1946). 
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executive and the legislature.98 Second, federalism values are 
implicated when federal courts interfere with what would otherwise be 
left to the states.99 When asked to answer questions about elections, 
courts have cited the principle that the federal judiciary should avoid 
entering the “political thicket” at the intersection of these two 
prudential concerns.100 
In Colegrove v. Green,101 the Court eschewed “issue[s] . . . of a 
peculiarly political nature and therefore not meet for judicial 
determination.”102 When asked to address malapportionment of 
electoral districts in Illinois, the Court said that it was not competent 
to redraw district maps.103 “It is hostile to a democratic system,” the 
Court continued, “to involve the judiciary in the politics of the 
people.”104 This insistence on remaining “aloof”105 diminished over 
time as the Court acknowledged that the importance of preserving the 
right to vote overshadows prudential doctrines of avoidance.106 By the 
time 2000 brought hanging chads and Bush v. Gore,107 the Court’s 
willingness to become “embroiled . . . in partisan conflict” contrasted 
sharply with its stark refusal in Colegrove.108 Professor Sam Issacharoff 
wrote about the new era that Bush v. Gore seemed to usher in—one of 
robust federal involvement in election administration, fully in the midst 
of the political thicket: “[T]he Supreme Court . . . has asserted a new 
constitutional requirement: to avoid disparate and unfair treatment of 
voters. And this obligation obviously cannot be limited to the recount 
process alone. . . . The [C]ourt’s new standard may create a more robust 
constitutional examination of voting practices.”109 
 
 98. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210–11 (1962) (“The nonjusticiability of a political 
question is primarily a function of the separation of powers. . . [and involves] [d]eciding whether 
a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of 
government.”). 
 99. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 552.  
 100. Id. 
 101. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 553. 
 104. Id. at 553–54. 
 105. Id. at 553. 
 106. See infra Part II.B. 
 107. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 108. Id. at 157 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 109. Samuel Issacharoff, Opinion, The Court in the Crossfire, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2000), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/14/opinion/the-court-in-the-crossfire.html [https://perma.cc/ 
D5AC-H6QX]. 
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B. The Right to Vote 
The U.S. Constitution does not enumerate an express right to 
vote. However, once a state extends the franchise, that “fundamental 
political right” is constitutionally protected.110 This right to vote—as 
central and fundamental as the right to bodily integrity—is 
“preservative of [all] other basic civil and political rights.”111 Allow the 
right to vote to be infringed upon, and that deprivation will completely 
“undermine[] the legitimacy of representative government.”112 When 
the right to vote is violated, the laws created and enforced by elected 
officials can no longer be considered an expression of citizens’ free 
choice and self-determination. As the Court said in Wesberry v. 
Sanders,113 “No right is more precious in a free country than that of 
having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, 
as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are 
illusory if the right to vote is undermined.”114  
In Reynolds v. Sims,115 the foundational decision on voting rights, 
the Supreme Court held that “any alleged infringement of the right of 
citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.”116 
There, the plaintiffs challenged the apportionment of Alabama’s 
legislative districts, claiming that the existing districts deprived them of 
their right to vote under the Equal Protection Clause.117 The district 
boundaries had not been adjusted to reflect population shifts and 
growth through the decades.118 At the time of the hearing, one 
Alabama state senate district contained over 600,000 people, while 
another contained only 15,417 people.119 The Reynolds plaintiffs had 
 
 110. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 
370 (1886)). The fundamental right to vote, protected by the Equal Protection Clause, is also a 
liberty interest protected by the Substantive Due Process Clause. See U.S. CONST. amends. V & 
XIV; United States v. Texas, 252 F. Supp. 234, 250 (W.D. Tex. 1966) (three-judge District Court), 
summarily aff’d, 384 U.S. 155 (1966) (“[I]n . . . light of Supreme Court pronouncements describing 
it as our most ‘precious’ right, and . . . the ‘essence of a democratic society,’ it cannot be doubted 
that the right to vote is one of the fundamental personal rights included within the concept of 
liberty as protected by the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause.”). 
 111. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562. 
 112. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969). 
 113. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
 114. Id. at 17. 
 115. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 116. Id. at 562. 
 117. Id. at 536–37. 
 118. Id. at 542–43. 
 119. Id. at 546. 
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been allowed to cast votes under the apportionment plan as it stood. 
Nevertheless, the Court held that the plaintiffs’ right to vote had been 
impaired.120 The right to vote, then, is not merely the right to cast a 
ballot, but also the right to have a “[f]ull and effective vote.”121 
The Court in Reynolds elaborated that the right to vote 
encompasses one’s right to “put a ballot in a box,” the right to be 
spared any destruction or alteration of the ballot once cast, the right to 
a ballot box that has not been stuffed fraudulently, the right to have 
one’s vote counted, and the right to a vote that is undiluted by 
malapportionment.122 This broad constitutional protection of voting 
rights runs the gamut of election administration. From the shaping of 
constituencies to the printing of electronic voting machine results, a 
state’s policies impacting the right to vote are subject to constitutional 
boundaries. Primaries, local elections, and referendums are all 
encompassed within these constitutional protections.123 If a citizen’s 
vote is lost, changed, or even accidently left out of a final tallying, that 
citizen’s constitutional right has been violated, just as it would be if she 
were prevented from casting any vote at all.124 A vote lost to a software 
breach or malfunction prevents the voter from participating in 
democracy by withholding from her the “political equality” that 
underlies the principle of “one person, one vote.”125  
Since Reynolds, the Court’s analysis of equal protection claims126 
concerning the right to vote has evolved.127 The primary driver of that 
 
 120. Id. at 566. 
 121. Id. at 565. 
 122. Id. at 554–57 (citations omitted). 
 123. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 661–62 (1944) (primary election); City of Phoenix 
v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 209 (1970) (local tax bond); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 
15, 395 U.S. 621, 628–29 (1969) (local tax bond); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 319–20 
(1941) (primary election). 
 124. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555 (“[T]he right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or 
dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise 
of the franchise.”). 
 125. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (emphasizing that “the conception of 
political equality . . . can mean only one thing—one person, one vote”). 
 126. Substantive due process claims can be brought in conjunction with equal protection 
claims when an election failure has deprived someone of her full and effective vote. See, e.g., 
League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Brunner, 548 F.3d 463, 474, 477–78 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding 
that plaintiffs brought valid equal protection and substantive due process claims where the state 
failed to prevent and correct election problems such as twelve-hour wait times at polling places, 
inadequate poll-worker training, voter rolls that lacked large swaths of voter names, and 
widespread misuse of provisional ballots that caused 22 percent of the ballots to be ineligible). 
 127. When a litigant brings a claim that her right to equal protection has been violated, she is 
essentially bringing a claim that the government has improperly treated her differently than those 
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evolution has been efficiency—because the right to vote is 
fundamental, every election law would trigger “strict scrutiny” under 
modern equal protection analysis.128 The Court recognized in 
Anderson v. Celebrezze129 that subjecting every election regulation to 
strict scrutiny would invalidate such large swaths of election codes that 
chaos would ensue.130  
A new, “more flexible standard” was implemented by the Court 
in Burdick v. Takushi.131 Now a state’s “precise” justifications for and 
the necessity of a burdensome rule are to be balanced against “the 
character and magnitude” of the alleged injury to the plaintiff’s 
constitutional rights.132 When a plaintiff challenges state election laws, 
courts must apply a more rigorous standard of review the more the law 
burdens First and Fourteenth Amendments rights.133 If a rule places a 
severe burden on those rights, it “must be narrowly drawn to advance 
a state interest of compelling importance.”134 If a rule only restricts 
those rights in a reasonable and nondiscriminatory way, then important 
regulatory interests are usually enough to justify the rule.135 For 
example, where state law prevents a candidate from listing more than 
one party affiliation on the ballot, the burden placed on voting rights is 
 
similarly situated to her. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522 (2004). Modern equal protection 
analysis requires courts to apply different standards of judicial scrutiny for different kinds of 
government actions. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439–41 (1985). 
Courts are skeptical of claims when the governmental action has neither infringed on a 
fundamental right nor differentiated between people on the basis of their race, national origin, 
ethnicity, or gender. Id. at 439–40. For these kinds of claims, the court merely applies “rational 
basis” scrutiny, making it almost certain that the challenged government action will be upheld. 
Id. On the other hand, when the challenged government action infringes on a fundamental right—
such as the right to have one’s vote counted equally—the court applies a heightened level of 
scrutiny. Id. at 440. The highest standard, “strict scrutiny,” requires the most of a challenged 
government action. Id. Namely, strict scrutiny requires that the government’s action advance a 
compelling interest and that it be narrowly tailored to serve that purpose. Id. Challenged 
governmental actions are very unlikely to survive strict scrutiny. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 
634 (1996). 
 128. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (holding that “laws are subjected to strict scrutiny” when 
they “impinge on personal rights protected by the Constitution”). 
 129. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983). 
 130. Id. at 788; see also Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (“[T]o subject every 
voting regulation to strict scrutiny and to require that the regulation be narrowly tailored to 
advance a compelling state interest . . . would tie the hands of States seeking to assure that 
elections are operated equitably and efficiently.”). 
 131. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434. 
 132. Id. (citing Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 135. Id.  
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not severe.136 The state’s interests in preventing voter confusion and 
ballot overcrowding are sufficiently weighty to justify the restriction.137 
On the other hand, where faulty voting machines prevent individuals’ 
votes from being properly counted, the burden on the right to vote is 
severe.138 This burden does not merely impact a “tangential aspect of 
the franchise”; it instead prevents some individuals from participating 
in the franchise altogether for reasons that are entirely outside of their 
control.139 These severe vote deprivations cannot be justified by a 
state’s interests in saving money, time, or administrative effort.140 
C. Procedural Due Process Claims About Election Challenges 
When an election challenger uses state law vehicles to challenge 
elections and election policies, she has purportedly already been 
deprived of her most precious liberty interest.141 Therefore, a state’s 
procedure for addressing these alleged vote deprivations must comport 
with the fairness principles of the Due Process Clause.142 In particular, 
procedural due process places requirements on governmental 
decisions that result in the deprivation of an individual’s Fourteenth 
Amendment liberty interest.143 In the case of an election failure, an 
individual’s lost or miscounted vote is not a “final” deprivation of her 
liberty interest until she has exhausted her state’s provided remedies 
to no avail. If an election challenger is successful in her state 
proceedings and the state appropriately responds to the election failure 
complained of—by conducting a recount, further investigation, or 
special election—there has been no deprivation of the right to vote. It 
is only when the state fails to act to correct an election failure and fails 
to provide an adequate remedy for election challengers that vote 
 
 136. See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 359 (1997) (“That a particular 
individual may not appear on the ballot as a particular party’s candidate does not severely burden 
that party’s associational rights.”). 
 137. Id. at 367. 
 138. Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d 843, 860–62, 868–69 (6th Cir. 2006), vacated as moot, 473 
F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
 139. Id. at 867. 
 140. See id. at 869 (“[T]he State’s proffered justifications of cost and training are wholly 
insufficient . . . . Administrative convenience is simply not a compelling justification in light of the 
fundamental nature of the right.”). 
 141. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) (“No right is more precious in a free 
country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws . . . .”). 
 142. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
 143. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). 
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deprivation becomes a constitutional violation. This means that claims 
of vote tampering or voting machine software glitches are not 
justiciable in federal court until the election challenger has raised the 
issue through her state’s particular process—be it summary, 
extrajudicial, or subject to rapid filing deadlines. Further, there is no 
common law basis for election challenges, so election challengers are 
limited to the statutory scheme supplied by the state legislature.144  
1. Procedural Due Process, Generally.  The Supreme Court has not 
yet fully delineated how claims about the unfairness of state election-
challenge procedures should be adjudicated. However, the Court has 
supplied general guidelines for procedural due process claims. Central 
to the principle of due process is a requirement that an individual be 
allowed a full, open, and fair hearing before the government may 
deprive her of a liberty interest.145 The Court has described this 
requirement as one that proceedings be “fundamentally fair,”146 and 
that a litigant be given “the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful 
time and in a meaningful manner.’”147 
In Mathews v. Eldridge,148 the Court introduced a balancing test 
for determining whether a particular process is constitutionally 
sufficient in its fairness to litigants: 
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally 
requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private 
interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of 
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures 
used, and the probable value . . . of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the 
 
 144. See, e.g., Parker v. Mount Olive Fire & Rescue Dist., 420 So. 2d 31, 33 (Ala. 1982) (citing 
“the well-settled principle that ‘[e]lection contests are not of common law origin, but are creatures 
of statutes which prescribe the terms and conditions of their exercise’” (alteration in original) 
(citation omitted)). 
 145. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (“An essential 
principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property ‘be preceded by notice 
and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.’” (citation omitted)); Morgan 
v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938) (“Those who are brought into contest with the 
Government . . . are entitled to be fairly advised of what the Government proposes and to be 
heard upon its proposals before it issues its final command.”). 
 146. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 33 (1981). 
 147. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). 
 148.   Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). 
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function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.149 
The Court went on to explain that “the degree of potential 
deprivation” is properly considered under the first factor.150 The 
second factor—the “reliability” of current procedures and potential 
alternatives151—is broad in scope. In applying this second factor, the 
Court identified several fairness characteristics, including whether the 
plaintiff has access to crucial information in the state’s possession, 
whether she has the right to introduce relevant evidence and 
arguments, and whether she has ample time to do so. The Court 
emphasized that the plaintiff in Mathews had “full access to all 
information relied upon by the state agency.”152 The plaintiff had also 
been given the opportunity “to submit additional evidence or 
arguments” and “to challenge directly the accuracy of information” 
submitted by the state agency.153 And the plaintiff “always” had the 
right to “submit new evidence,” instead of being held to a strict 
discovery or filing schedule.154  
In its opinion in Mathews, and in several opinions since, the Court 
cited Judge Henry J. Friendly’s formulation of procedural due 
process.155 Judge Friendly prioritizes “elements of a fair hearing,” 
including an unbiased tribunal,156 notice,157 the right to present 
evidence (including the right to call witnesses),158 the right to know 
 
 149. Id. at 335 (emphasis added). 
 150. Id. at 341 (emphasis added). 
 151. Id. at 343. 
 152. Id. at 345–46. 
 153. Id. at 346. 
 154. Id. at 347. 
 155. See id. at 343, 348 (discussing procedural due process and citing Henry J. Friendly, Some 
Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975)); see also Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 110 (2000) 
(same); Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 325–26 (1985) (same); 
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985) (same); Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. 
Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981) (same). 
 156. See Friendly, supra note 155, at 1279; see also Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. 
Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 617 (1993) (“[D]ue process requires a 
‘neutral and detached judge in the first instance.’” (citation omitted)). 
 157. See, e.g., Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 234 (2006) (“[D]ue process requires the 
government to provide adequate notice of the impending taking.”). 
 158. See Friendly, supra note 155, at 1282; see also Londoner v. City and Cty. of Denver, 210 
U.S. 373, 386 (1908) (“[A] hearing in its very essence demands that he who is entitled to it shall 
have the right to support his allegations by argument however brief, and, if need be, by proof, 
however informal.”). 
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opposing evidence, and the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses.159 
Like the notice requirement,160 the “unbiased tribunal” requirement 
has been described as “the floor established by the Due Process 
Clause.”161 A “fair trial in a fair tribunal” cannot be guaranteed, 
according to the Court, unless the adjudicator has “no actual bias 
against the [individual] or interest in the outcome of his particular 
case.”162 
2. Circuit Approaches to Procedural Due Process Claims About 
Election Challenges.  Federal courts of appeals have not followed the 
Mathews balancing test for procedural due process when hearing 
claims about election challenges. The circuits have tended to follow a 
more formalistic analysis of these claims, guided by notions of 
federalism163 and judicial economy.164 A common rendering comes 
from the First Circuit in Griffin v. Burns.165 The Griffin court 
distinguished between cases in which federal courts should intervene, 
on the one hand, and on the other, cases that feature mere “garden 
variety election irregularities” and facially adequate state remedies.166 
Griffin treated the election process as “including as part thereof the 
state’s administrative and judicial corrective process.”167 The court 
reported that federal courts do not, and should not, intervene in state 
 
 159. See Friendly, supra note 155, at 1282–87 (discussing the rights to “[k]now the [e]vidence 
[a]gainst [o]ne” and to “[c]all [w]itnesses” as elements of a fair hearing). 
 160. Though notice is not in question when a private litigant initiates an election challenge, 
the reasoning behind the notice requirement is relevant in such a proceeding. The Court has 
explained that the purpose of the notice requirement is to allow individuals to adequately prepare 
for hearings. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 14 (1978) (“The purpose of 
notice under the Due Process Clause is to apprise the affected individual of, and permit adequate 
preparation for, an impending ‘hearing.’”). This rationale is informative in considering the harsh 
deadlines often featured in state election-challenge procedures. See supra Part I.A. The Due 
Process Clause, therefore, is implicated when deadlines are so short that election challengers 
cannot adequately prepare beforehand. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 (requiring that a litigant be 
provided a “meaningful time” period (citations omitted)). 
 161. Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904–05 (1997) (citations omitted). 
 162. Id. 
 163. See, e.g., Shannon v. Jacobowitz, 394 F.3d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Absent a clear and 
unambiguous mandate from Congress, we are not inclined to undertake such a wholesale 
expansion of our jurisdiction into an area which, with certain narrow and well defined exceptions, 
has been in the exclusive cognizance of the state courts.”). 
 164. See infra notes 192–97 and accompanying text. 
 165. Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065 (1st Cir. 1978). 
 166. Id. at 1076–77; see Shannon, 394 F.3d at 96 (citing Griffin’s “garden variety” election-
dispute paradigm); Duncan v. Poythress, 657 F.2d 691, 702 (5th Cir. Unit B Sept. 1981) (referring 
to the Griffin framework for adjudicating election challenges). 
 167. Griffin, 570 F.2d at 1078. 
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election administration as long as “the alleged misconduct is lacking in 
‘enormity’” and the available state remedy “appear[s] to be 
adequate.”168 This standard allows for federal intervention only when 
the election process—including the “state corrective process”—rises to 
the level “of patent and fundamental unfairness.”169 
The First Circuit only intervened in Griffin because the election 
challengers could demonstrate both that “a broad-gauged unfairness 
. . . infected the results of . . . [the] election” and that “the federal court 
was the only practical forum [available] for redress” because no state 
procedure existed for election challenges of the sort.170 The court 
viewed this high bar as necessary, saying that the instant case was “one 
of the perhaps exceptional cases where a district court could properly 
exercise the limited supervisory role that such courts have in election 
cases.”171 The Ninth Circuit has gone a step further than Griffin, saying 
that “garden variety election irregularities generally do not violate the 
Due Process Clause, even if they control the outcome of the vote or 
election.”172 
The Seventh Circuit has also been hesitant to hear claims 
concerning election challenges, saying that “not every election 
irregularity . . . will give rise to a constitutional claim.”173 The Seventh 
Circuit requires a showing that state officials purposefully, 
systematically, or willfully acted to deprive voters of their liberty 
interest in a meaningfully executed vote.174 This extra requirement 
leaves federal courts impotent when election results are improperly 
impacted by electronic voting machine malfunctions, software 
misprogramming, a state official’s negligence, or even intentional 
tampering by private parties or foreign states. The Seventh Circuit 
went so far as to say that such election failures “fall far short of 
constitutional infractions” simply because they do not involve 
fraudulent or willful conduct of a state official.175 The Second Circuit 
also requires a showing that intentional action by a state official caused 
 
 168. Id. at 1077 (citations omitted). 
 169. Id. at 1077.  
 170. Id. at 1078–79 (emphasis added). 
 171. Id. at 1079. 
 172. Bennett v. Yoshina, 140 F.3d 1218, 1226 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 173. Hennings v. Grafton, 523 F.2d 861, 864 (7th Cir. 1975). 
 174. See id. (“Infringements of voting rights found to have risen to a constitutional level 
include . . . purposeful or systematic discrimination against voters . . . and other willful conduct 
which undermines the organic processes by which candidates are selected . . . .”). 
 175. Id. 
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the election failure.176 That court has said that federal “[c]ourts may 
consider the adequacy and fairness of the state remedy only after they 
first conclude that” the election failure was caused “by intentional state 
action.”177 The Eighth Circuit, too, requires intentional unlawful 
conduct on the part of state actors before becoming involved in a due 
process election claim.178 The Eighth Circuit has further said that even 
when a state provides no forum for an election challenge, federal courts 
should not hear a procedural due process claim that does not allege 
intentional government wrongdoing.179 
In the Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, Griffin’s formalistic 
distinction has become more extreme: either an election problem was 
caused by “an intentional act on the part of the government or its 
officials,” or the election problem is merely “garden variety” and must 
be ignored by the federal courts.180 Even massive election failures could 
fall within the latter, outcast category. In fact, the Second Circuit said 
that a malfunctioning electronic voting machine is “the paradigmatic 
example of a ‘garden variety’ election dispute” that federal courts 
should avoid.181 The Second Circuit also identifies “mechanical and 
human error in counting votes” and “technical deficiencies in printing 
ballots” as beyond the ken of the Due Process Clause—presumably 
even if those failures impact the outcome of elections.182 
In expressing its reluctance to intervene in cases about election 
challenges, the Griffin court cited a worry over the level of 
administrative oversight it would have to provide. The court imagined 
having to count ballots, examine their validity, and “enter into the 
details of the administration of the election.”183 The Second Circuit, 
too, cited this concern of “henceforth be[ing] thrust into the details of 
virtually every election, tinkering with the state’s election machinery, 
reviewing petitions, registration cards, vote tallies, and certificates of 
 
 176. See Shannon v. Jacobowitz, 394 F.3d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 2005) (describing a voting machine 
failure as a mere “unfortunate but unintended irregularity”). 
 177. Id. 
 178. See Pettengill v. Putnam Cty. R-1 Sch. Dist., 472 F.2d 121, 122 (8th Cir. 1973) (refusing 
to intervene “in the absence of aggravating factors” such as intentional racial discrimination, 
fraudulent interference, or other affirmative unlawful acts by government actors). 
 179. See id. (“Appellants complain that the state courts of Missouri will not afford them a 
forum for their complaint [of an election failure]. The lack of a state remedy to appellants does 
not alone operate to give federal jurisdiction over their cause.” (citations omitted)). 
 180. Shannon, 394 F.3d at 96. 
 181. Id. (citation omitted). 
 182. Id. (citations omitted). 
 183. Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065, 1078 (1st Cir. 1978). 
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election for all manner of error and insufficiency under state and 
federal law.”184 
As discussed further below, the circuits’ reductive categories—
“garden variety” errors, intentional government wrongdoing, errors 
with “enormity,” state challenge procedures that “appear” to be fair—
are a departure from traditional notions of due process, constitutional 
protections of voting rights, and the tests established by Burdick and 
Mathews. 
III.  DEMANDING MORE FROM ELECTION CHALLENGE 
PROCEDURES 
Federal courts have improperly handled claims about the 
unconstitutional unfairness of state election challenges. This Part 
proposes a new analytical approach for these electoral due process 
claims—that is, claims that involve both alleged vote deprivations and 
fundamentally unfair state challenge procedures. This approach is 
faithful to both Burdick and Mathews. 
A. Uprooting “Garden Variety” Unfairness: The Brokenness of 
Circuit Approaches 
The procedural due process analysis currently employed by the 
circuits improperly undercuts the injuries—and rights—at stake in 
election challenges. First, the circuits have departed from proper 
Mathews procedural due process analysis in the context of election 
challenges. Second, the circuits have improperly avoided applying 
Burdick altogether, thwarting equal protection claims that should 
often be heard on the merits in federal court. Third, judicial concerns 
over micromanaging election administration are misplaced and should 
not be cited as a reason to evade claims of election failure. 
First, while unfair challenge procedures can reach the level of a 
substantive burden on the right to vote, the Court has enunciated one 
test for analyzing claims about procedural unfairness and a distinct test 
for claims about substantive liberty-interest deprivations. The Circuits, 
however, have been hybridizing these two distinct steps, completely 
conflating a challenger’s vote deprivation and her procedural due 
process deprivation. The court in Griffin stated that “local election 
irregularities, including even claims of official misconduct, do not 
usually rise to the level of constitutional violations where adequate state 
 
 184. Powell v. Power, 436 F.2d 84, 86 (2d Cir. 1970). 
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corrective procedures exist.”185 That court also said that if an election 
process were “patent[ly] and fundamental[ly unfair[],” that deprivation 
of the right to vote would merit intervention from a federal court only 
if the “state corrective process” is found inadequate.186 But inadequacy 
is not the constitutional test for procedural fairness. Mathews provides 
a balancing test that accounts for the magnitude of the underlying 
deprivation. Mere labeling of a process as adequate is not a substitute 
for that constitutional analysis. A threshold question of adequacy gives 
state procedures and election laws a higher level of deference than they 
are owed under Mathews or Burdick. 
Second, if federal courts continue to extend such deference to 
state challenge proceedings, litigants will never reach the merits of the 
vote-deprivation claim, and the extent of the underlying election 
failure will never be determined. If a challenge procedure truly is 
unfair, and if a challenger alleges procedural impossibility in federal 
court, then by her very admission and petition, she has not had the 
opportunity to gain access to the crucial evidence that would be needed 
to prove that the election failure was beyond a “garden variety” error. 
It is no wonder that federal courts so rarely grant relief under this 
model. Even the most extensive cybersecurity attack would not appear 
“that unfair” if no one has been allowed to look closely enough to know 
that it happened. Griffin’s offhand fashioning of conjunctive 
elements—broad-based unfairness in the election and a challenge 
process that is patently and fundamentally unfair—heightens pleading 
requirements for challengers. These challengers—who have already 
turned to the federal courts because of prohibitive procedural 
requirements—are thus again barred from having an opportunity for 
their claims of election failure to be fully heard and fairly tried.  
The court in Griffin, and the circuits that have since followed suit, 
freely label alleged election injuries as “garden variety” unfairness. 
This formalistic category is inapposite for election administration in the 
digital age. If at the pleading stage, the court can only pinpoint a few 
dozen lost votes, it should not label the seemingly small loss a mere 
“garden variety” error or presume that those votes are the full extent 
of the election failure. If there are allegations of voting machine 
misprogramming or a cybersecurity breach, and if an election 
challenger has in-hand proof of even a few malfunctions at the pleading 
stage, then the integrity of the whole process should be carefully 
 
 185. Griffin, 570 F.2d at 1077 (emphasis added).  
 186. Id. 
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inspected. The few vote deprivations that a challenger is able to detect 
during the short time period187 before filing suit are likely the tip of the 
iceberg. 
In addition, whatever level of scrutiny this “garden variety” 
formalistic labeling may be, it is certainly not the Burdick strict scrutiny 
that is triggered when a severe burden has been placed on the right to 
vote. In conflating substantive and procedural rights, which are 
analytically and ideologically distinct, the circuits have abandoned 
Burdick balancing, lowering the scrutiny for both claims to the 
forgiving level of deference courts apply in ordinary procedural due 
process claims.188 
More worrisome yet is the requirement imposed by the Second, 
Seventh, and Eighth Circuits that election challengers raising 
procedural due process claims allege intentional wrongdoing by a state 
official.189 Proving intent is notoriously difficult as it is.190 But this 
requirement is also hopelessly outmoded for a digital age in which the 
largest risk of election failure is not poll-worker fraud, but foreign 
cybersecurity attacks that could be successfully staged by an amateur 
computer programmer within sixty seconds.191 The liberty interest 
involved is so important, and the potential loss so large, that the 
intentionality of bad behavior by a state employee should not be a 
requisite for federal court intervention when things go wrong. If a 
state’s administration of elections allows election technology, systems, 
or databases to be compromised, unnoticed and uncorrected, this 
neglect itself deprives citizens of their votes. This level of culpability is 
sufficient to place the resulting election failures within the cognizance 
of the Due Process Clause—and of the federal judiciary. 
Third, the court’s worry in Griffin about avoiding federal judicial 
micromanagement of tedious election details is unfounded. A federal 
 
 187. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (noting North Carolina’s two-day filing 
deadline). 
 188. In an ordinary procedural due process claim—for instance, where property rights are at 
stake—the government’s interest in administrative ease fares well in the Mathews balancing test. 
See supra Part II.C.1. In the voting rights context, however, the interest and potential deprivation 
involved are so weighty as to overwhelm interests in efficiency or ease. See generally supra notes 
131–40 and accompanying text.  
 189. See supra notes 180–82 and accompanying text. 
 190. See, e.g., United States v. Marengo Cty. Comm’n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1556, 1564–65 (11th Cir. 
1984) (holding that proving discriminatory intent is not required under the Voting Rights Act 
(“VRA”), in part because that showing was so difficult to make that the U.S. Department of 
Justice had stopped bringing claims under the VRA). 
 191. See Newmarker, supra note 26. 
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court need not count ballots or “supervise the administrative details of 
a local election” to intervene when state challenge procedures violate 
due process.192 An electoral due process claim does not force the 
federal court to control the detailed operations of elections. Rather, 
these claims ask the court to evaluate the fairness of procedures and 
burdens on federal rights—tasks the federal judiciary is competent to 
perform.  
In cases where the federal court decides it must intervene, it can 
do so without itself performing the tasks of fashioning election 
administration policies anew or of investigating the credibility of each 
ballot cast. A federal court could, for instance, merely invalidate an 
unfair state procedural rule and then order the state to rehear the 
challenger’s claim in a fundamentally fair manner. Federal courts have 
the power to fashion any number of remedies—with varying levels of 
supervision—when procedural due process violations are found. Even 
an instruction to a state that it must rehear a challenger’s claim could 
give that litigant a better chance at fundamental fairness. This sort of 
involvement and oversight by the federal judiciary is not novel. For 
example, when voters challenge redistricting plans, federal courts do 
not shy away from finding malapportionment and redrawing district 
lines themselves.193 Rather, courts reckon with the reality that would 
result from the perpetuation of the status quo, and they demand fairer 
policies from the states. Here, too, federal courts should be willing to 
become involved in election challenges so that they can require that 
state procedural rules assure voters that their votes are counted 
equally. 
For the First Circuit to refuse any intervention in elections because 
of an unwillingness to engage in total, detailed involvement in the 
process, belies the degree of federal courts’ flexibility in fashioning 
remedies. For example, in Duncan v. Poythress,194 the Fifth Circuit 
found fundamental unfairness in Georgia’s election process.195 Instead 
of avoiding a due process analysis of the challenged state procedure 
like the Griffin court, the Fifth Circuit identified the unfair aspects of 
the election process and ordered the State of Georgia to abandon the 
 
 192. Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065, 1078 (1st Cir. 1978). 
 193. See, e.g., Colleton Cty. Council v. McConnell, 201 F. Supp. 2d 618, 627, 629 (D.S.C. 2002) 
(rejecting all six proposed districting plans and drawing its own map in accordance with 
constitutional requirements). 
 194. Duncan v. Poythress, 657 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. Unit B Sept. 1981). 
 195. Id. at 693, 708 (holding that the state’s refusal to hold a special election to replace a 
retiring state supreme court justice disenfranchised voters). 
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specific unfair practices so that Georgia voters would have a way to 
meaningfully participate in representative government: “The Georgia 
voters are not asking the federal courts to count ballots or otherwise 
‘enter into the details of the administration of (an) election.’ Their 
request is far simpler and more basic: they ask for the election itself, as 
required by state law.”196 In ordering Georgia to hold a special election, 
the federal court did not become responsible for administrative 
oversight of that election.197 Nor did the court have to write a code to 
instruct Georgia precisely how it must hold the election. Rather, the 
court in Duncan enunciated a standard and allowed the state to 
manage the details of obeying the resulting order. Federal courts 
adjudicating electoral due process claims should not avoid analysis of 
the merits merely because of the looming need to fashion a remedy.  
B. Rebalancing Burdick: A New Approach for Electoral Due Process 
Claims 
When an election challenger seeks relief from a voting rights 
violation, or even seeks to determine whether that right has been 
intruded upon, that litigation is an extension of her right to vote. The 
election aftermath that verifies vote counts and affirms a victor is also 
a part of the election process.198 When an equal protection question of 
vote deprivation intersects with a due process question of state election 
challenge fairness, federal courts should faithfully apply the test of 
Mathews and use the resulting balance to apply the Burdick test. 
Where federal rights intersect, the decisional rule that applies should 
provide rightsholders with more footholds, not fewer, though the 
truncated approaches of the circuits discussed above fail in this regard. 
This Section lays out an approach that is properly preservative of 
constitutional rights. 
In brief, when a federal court encounters one of these 
intersectional electoral due process cases, it should first apply the 
procedural due process test from Mathews to determine just how 
unfair—that is, how burdensome—the state challenge procedure was 
for the plaintiff. Second, the court should calculate a “total burden” 
 
 196. Id. at 703. 
 197. See id. at 708 (rejecting the argument that a federal court did not have a role to play in a 
state election).  
 198. Cf. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (“[T]he right of suffrage can be denied by 
a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly 
prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.”). 
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that accounts for both the procedural unfairness burden from Mathews 
analysis and any burden that can be demonstrated through factual 
proof that an election failure occurred—for example, any data 
revealing a software glitch and any testimony about tampering. This 
total burden should be found severe whether the plaintiff faced an 
impossibly burdensome state process and as a result lacks compelling 
supporting evidence, or whether the plaintiff faced a moderately 
burdensome state process but was nevertheless able to muster 
meaningful evidence of an election failure. Third, if this total burden is 
severe, the court should ask, under the Burdick balancing test,199 
whether that infringement on the right to vote is justified by a state 
policy that is narrowly drawn to advance a compellingly important 
interest. Finally, if the constitutional infringement is not so justified 
under Burdick, the court should fashion an appropriate remedy to 
vindicate voters’ rights. 
1. Applying Mathews: Calculating the Burden of Unfairness.  To 
review, the Mathews fairness test balances (1) the magnitude of the 
plaintiff’s interest, (2) the state’s interest in preserving the procedural 
status quo, and (3) the soundness of the process at issue, when 
considered in light of its inherent reliability and possible alternatives. 
a. The Plaintiff-Voter’s Interest.  In electoral due process claims, 
the first Mathews factor should weigh strongly in favor of the plaintiff, 
as a categorical matter. The liberty interest at stake is that which is 
preservative of all others.200 Without a meaningful right to vote, 
governance ceases to be self-determined by citizens, and all property 
interests and other liberty interests are vulnerable.201 Accordingly, like 
the liberty interest in being free from imprisonment, the liberty interest 
in voting should be given the utmost weight. In addition, Mathews 
instructs that the “degree of potential deprivation” affects the weight 
given to this factor.202 Where an election challenger alleges a failure 
like electronic voting machine misprogramming, the potential 
 
 199. See supra notes 131–40 and accompanying text. 
 200. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (holding that the right to vote is 
“preservative of other basic civil and political rights”). 
 201. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) (“No right is more precious in a free 
country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as 
good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is 
undermined.”). 
 202. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 412 (1976). 
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deprivation is not merely the loss of the individual challenger’s right to 
an effective vote, but the total deprivation of an effective vote for the 
voters of entire voting districts.  
In addition, each time a state ignores election failures, the 
resulting lack of transparency not only leaves past interference 
irreversible, but also incentivizes outcome-determinative election 
interference and shields election administrators from accountability 
that would deter future sloppiness.203 These liberty-interest 
deprivations, then, harm past voters and future voters by making it 
systemically more likely that citizens will continue to be deprived of an 
equally effective vote. 
Further, elections today, post-HAVA, are situated against a new 
backdrop of threats in which system-wide failure is more likely. 
Remote cybersecurity attacks were aimed at the majority of states 
during the 2016 election cycle, and these breaches were successful in 
an as-of-yet unknown number of jurisdictions.204 As election 
technology has advanced, money allotted for the training of state 
election administrators has not, so even innocent mistakes have the 
potential to devastate election accuracy.  
Because the interest involved in these cases is so weighty, and the 
potential deprivation so expansive, across voters and across time, the 
first Mathews factor strongly favors dismantling burdensome challenge 
procedures. 
b. The State’s Interest in the Status Quo.  The next Mathews 
factor—the state’s interest in continuing under the current procedural 
rules205—should uniformly be given little weight in these electoral due 
process claims. The potential state interests underlying the prohibitive 
 
 203. Congressional researchers report: 
Broadly speaking, defensive measures range from those aimed at prevention of an 
attack or other incident, to detection and response, to recovery after an attack . . . . [I]t 
is now generally recognized among cybersecurity experts that preventive measures are 
insufficient by themselves . . . . In many cases, successful attacks might not be 
discovered until months later, if at all . . . . Such attacks could be especially serious if 
aimed at manipulating vote counts to change the outcome of an election. Effective 
defense requires ways of detecting, responding to, and recovering from successful 
intrusions.  
BURRIS & FISCHER, supra note 28, at 17 (citation omitted). 
 204. See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text. 
 205. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (“[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process 
generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: . . . [third,] the Government’s interest, 
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedural requirement would entail.”). 
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procedural burdens discussed in Part I include repose, finality, and 
minimized disruption of the election process.206 These related 
justifications depend on two factual assumptions: that determinative 
election failures are relatively infrequent, and that the general 
populace has faith in the integrity of the election process.  
Today, as discussed above, both of those assumptions are suspect. 
Repose of election-night returns has been lost—not by allowing 
election challenges, but by public knowledge of actual attacks aimed at 
American elections.207 Finality becomes less important as a 
government interest when data shows that elections are more 
frequently tampered with, and that the candidate first declared winner 
is less likely to be the rightful one. And closing the gates on election 
challenges cannot preserve trust in a process that is already widely 
doubted. Americans lack faith in election integrity; that confidence has 
been declining since 2000.208 The United States is the Western 
democracy with the lowest score on the 2016 Perceptions of Electoral 
Integrity index.209 Voter distrust is also apparent in empty polling 
places on election days. Voter turnout is strongly correlated with trust 
in the accuracy of election outcomes,210 and “[t]he United States has 
long had one of the lowest levels of voter turnout among all equivalent 
democratic states and developed economies.”211 Rather than disrupting 
the public’s perception of election integrity, allowing election 
challenges a full and fair hearing would bring transparency that could 
 
 206. See, e.g., Douglas, Discouraging Election Contests, supra note 34, at 1024 (“The system 
craves finality, particularly on election night . . . . A contested election undermines the notion that 
the winner has an electoral mandate.”). 
 207. See supra notes 9–24 and the accompanying text. 
 208. See Norris, supra note 23, at 22 (noting declining public confidence in elections since 
2000). 
 209. Holly Ann Garnett, Max Grömping & Pippa Norris, Why Don’t More Americans Vote? 
Maybe Because They Don’t Trust U.S. Elections, WASH. POST (Dec. 26, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/12/26/why-dont-more-americans-
vote-maybe-because-they-dont-trust-u-s-elections/ [https://perma.cc/UN3V-4VLU] (“The U.S. 
ranks 52nd out of 153 countries worldwide in the 2016 Perceptions of Electoral Integrity index, 
and at the bottom of equivalent Western democracies.”). 
 210. Norris, supra note 23, at 14 (“The results of the multivariate analysis confirmed that 
American perceptions of electoral integrity predicted significantly lower levels of reported voting 
turnout, even after controlling for several standard factors which are also associated with 
participation, including educational qualifications, age, sex, race, support for the winning 
presidential candidate and political interest.”). 
 211. Garnett et al., supra note 209. Norris reports that voter turnout in the United States has 
tended to be “about 10–20 points below equivalent European societies.” Norris, supra note 23, at 
14.  
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give voters confidence that their votes are being accurately and 
effectively counted. 
States could also argue that an interest in swift determination 
justifies truncated proceedings and short deadlines. There is an 
important government interest in ensuring that individuals entering 
elected office and engaging in governance are not dismantled midterm 
by a challenge that could have, and should have, been brought sooner. 
However, this interest loses its salience when states impose stringent 
deadlines months in advance of inauguration day.212 For timeliness 
requirements to be narrowly tailored, they would have to be more 
directly connected to the dates of operation for the office in question—
whether that timing be legislative sessions, judicial terms, or 
inauguration day. While it might still be unsettling for the public to 
have to wait for legal proceedings to confirm the victor of an election, 
it would be much more unsettling to swiftly insulate the victory of the 
wrong candidate. Better to wait two months to ensure the soundness 
of election results than to silence doubts and usher in a four- or six-year 
term of illegitimate governance. Further, the results of the 2016 
presidential election were challenged in five states,213 and America 
survived the discomfort of waiting for the results.214 
Mathews did say that it is appropriate to consider governmental 
interests in efficient, economical processes, but this interest is only 
moderately persuasive in the electoral due process context. It is not 
clear how earlier filing deadlines or involvement of the state legislature 
as an extrajudicial decisionmaker would save states money or effort. If 
 
 212. See Douglas, Procedural Fairness, supra note 43, at 36 (“A state’s process has resulted in 
a ‘failed election’ when its contest provisions still do not allow the state to identify a winner by 
the date on which the winner is to take office.” (citation omitted)).  
 213. See Tresa Baldas, Kathleen Gray, Paul Egan, Detroit Free Press, Jason Stein, Milwaukee 
Journal Sentinel, Jeff Burlew, Tallahassee Democrat & the Associated Press, Election 2016 
Recount: Where 5 States Stand, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Dec. 6, 2016, 2:07 PM), 
https://www.freep.com/story/news/nation/2016/12/06/election-2016-recount-where-5-states-
stand/95037554/ [https://perma.cc/K97W-TM6U] (noting that Wisconsin, Michigan, 
Pennsylvania, Nevada, and Florida are “contending with requests for recounts of ballots cast in 
the [2016] presidential election”); see also The Latest: 5 Nevada Counties to Recount Presidential 
Race, WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 2016), https://web.archive.org/web/20161201081843/https://www.
washingtonpost.com/national/the-latest-stein-to-seek-presidential-recount-in-michigan/
2016/11/30/c760d82c-b724-11e6-939c-91749443c5e5_story.html [https://perma.cc/D7V5-FLTB] 
(discussing Nevada’s recount effort). 
 214. See Steve Eder, Stein Ends Recount Bid, But Says It Revealed Flaws in Voting System, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/us/stein-ends-recount-bid-but-
says-it-revealed-flaws-in-voting-system.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/9YGF-HPYR] (reporting 
that Jill Stein, the Green Party candidate in the 2016 presidential election, closed her recount 
effort on December 13, 2016).  
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anything, allowing election challengers to follow procedures more 
similar to those imposed on ordinary civil plaintiffs would improve 
administrability for judges, clerks, and other judicial staff, who would 
have to master fewer procedural eccentricities. It is conceivable that 
prohibitive state procedures could save states money; after all, the 
cheapest case for the government to defend against is a case that never 
makes it off the ground. But litigation always costs the government 
money, no matter how meritorious. Any savings that result from killing 
worthwhile claims should, as a principle of public policy, not count for 
much. 
c. The Reliability and Fairness of Procedures. The final Mathews 
prong, unlike the other two, should be reweighed for each new 
procedural rule challenged through an electoral due process claim. 
Though the resulting fairness values for individual procedures will 
differ, this Mathews prong should always be applied in a way that 
honors traditional notions of fairness. That is, the right to be heard “at 
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner” should be understood 
as requiring impartial factfinders, an opportunity to conduct 
meaningful discovery, and reasonable deadlines that allow for 
investigation and preparation.215 Consider the following examples of 
state election challenge procedures, evaluated under this Mathews 
prong. 
i. Shortened Deadlines.  The Court has made clear that fairness in 
timing is a crucial element of procedural due process.216 Many states, 
however, require that challenges be filed within a very short window 
following the election.217 This accelerated schedule often also constricts 
the periods of time for discovery, for the hearing itself, and for 
appeals.218 These tight deadlines make it less likely that election 
challengers will be able to adequately prepare before their hearing. If 
a challenger has two business days between uncovering the election 
 
 215. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). 
 216. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 347 (1976) (holding that a litigant must be 
given “the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time,’” and noting approvingly a procedure 
that allowed plaintiffs to submit new evidence at any time (quotation omitted)); see also supra 
note 160 (discussing notice—the lynchpin of procedural due process—and its basis in the rationale 
that litigants should benefit from fairness in timing). 
 217. See supra Part I.A. 
 218. See supra Part I. 
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failure and the filing deadline219—and if her hearing follows just as 
quickly after filing—the timing of that hearing cannot be considered 
“meaningful.”220 A litigant on that schedule has no reasonable 
opportunity to investigate, conduct discovery, prepare evidence, 
choose witnesses, or frame arguments. Therefore, shortened deadlines 
should be seen as adding to the procedural burden on plaintiff-voters. 
ii. Summary and Legislative Adjudication.  The most basic “element[] 
of a fair hearing” is an unbiased tribunal.221 Nevertheless, most states 
leave election challenges concerning state offices to the state 
legislature.222 For these challenges, the decision made by the state 
legislature is the first and final decision rendered on the matter, as no 
appeals process is available.223 Election challenges are inherently 
political, and the result of successful challenges is usually the 
replacement of a public official with someone of the opposing party. 
These stakes render a state legislature a quite biased tribunal. A 
Republican-controlled state house will always be incentivized to 
resolve election challenges in favor of a Republican gubernatorial 
candidate. A majority-Democrat legislature will always be incentivized 
to resolve challenges in favor of a Democratic candidate for state 
senate. The incentive to secure another seat for the political party in 
power is an interest in the outcome of the case. Therefore, legislatures 
and commissions comprised of legislative and executive leaders are not 
“impartial and disinterested tribunal[s]” for the purposes of 
adjudicating election challenges.224 
Further, states often have regulations or ethical rules concerning 
campaign donations to elected state judges made by litigants with cases 
 
 219. See, e.g., supra note 48 and accompanying text (noting North Carolina’s two-day filing 
deadline). 
 220. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the 
opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” (citations omitted)).  
 221. Friendly, supra note 155, at 1279. See Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. 
Laborers Pension Trust for So. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 617 (1993) (“[D]ue process requires a ‘neutral 
and detached judge in the first instance’ . . . .”) (quoting Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61–62 
(1972)). 
 222. See Douglas, Procedural Fairness, supra note 43, at 5 (“By far, the most common 
mechanism states use for resolving contests for state house and senate seats is to leave the matter 
to each respective house in the legislature.”).  
 223. See id. 
 224. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980). 
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on their dockets.225 Legislators in these states, however, are not 
prohibited from accepting campaign donations from candidates whose 
fates they decide in election challenges.226 Such a biased tribunal for an 
inherently partisan inquiry offends traditional notions of procedural 
due process. This sort of challenge process makes decision-making less 
likely to be reliable, and more likely to be based on the political party 
or the well-placed financial investments—that is, campaign 
contributions—of the litigants. Guaranteeing judicial processes for all 
election challengers would offer the same protections already 
established for ordinary civil litigants and criminal defendants alike—
ethical rules and state campaign finance regulations. 
Though the alignment of judges with a particular political party is 
considered by many to be a systemic ill, in cases where an election 
outcome hinges on a factual dispute, judicial involvement is the lesser 
evil. There is always a chance that judges will act in accordance with 
their ideological preferences—whether in criminal sentencing hearings 
or in claims of hate speech. The legal system, though imperfect, is 
equipped with safeguards to prevent arbitrary dispute resolution. 
Trials, unlike legislative votes, result in the creation of an evidentiary 
record that can serve as the basis of an appeal. Trial judges are subject 
to appellate review. They can be forced to provide reasoned opinions 
supporting their rulings. And judges, unlike legislators, are subject to 
ethical requirements that they remain independent and impartial. 
Even that aspirational commitment of judges, standing alone, makes 
them more likely to function as neutral, reliable decisionmakers than 
state legislators, who might feel a well-intentioned duty to represent 
the partisan interests of their constituents. Therefore, summary 
procedures and legislative adjudication should be seen as adding to the 
procedural burden on plaintiff-voters. 
 
 225. For example, the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge disqualify herself 
if she “knows . . . that a party, a party’s lawyer, or the law firm of a party’s lawyer has within the 
previous three years made aggregate contributions to the judge’s retention in an amount that is 
greater than $50.” UTAH CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.11(A)(4) (2016). See generally CYNTHIA 
GRAY, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS. CTR. FOR JUD. ETHICS, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION BASED 
ON CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS (Nov. 2016) (reporting that at least seventeen states have court 
rules, rules in the judicial code of conduct, or statutes that provide for judicial disqualification 
when a party has made sufficient past campaign contributions to the judge). 
 226. This author could not find any scholarship on the ethical implications of campaign 
contributions or expenditures benefiting a state legislator who is involved in the legislative 
resolution of an election challenge. 
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iii. Restrictive Discovery and Evidentiary Rules.  The Court has said that 
fundamental fairness requires that a litigant be given “the opportunity 
to be heard ‘. . . in a meaningful manner.’”227 This principle of fairness 
was fleshed out in Mathews when the Court emphasized that the 
plaintiff had “full access to all information relied upon by the state 
agency.”228 The Court also noted that the plaintiff had been given the 
opportunity “to submit additional evidence or arguments” and “to 
challenge directly the accuracy of information” submitted by the state 
agency.229 Judge Friendly, too, identifies elements of fairness related to 
discovery and the evidentiary aspects of a proceeding. He enshrines as 
traditional safeguards of due process the right to present evidence 
(including the right to call witnesses), the right to know opposing 
evidence, and the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses.230  
When states severely circumscribe the challenger’s scope of 
discovery, as in Louisiana,231 or destroy, as a matter of course, crucial 
voting machine data, as in Georgia,232 a challenger loses her 
“opportunity to be heard . . . ‘in a meaningful manner.’”233 A challenger 
effectively has no opportunity to make proofs, raise arguments, or 
challenge the state’s factual assertions if the state has exclusive 
possession of information central to the alleged election failure. Such 
a proceeding is less reliable because only one side of the adversarial 
process has access to the determinative evidence. Without a guarantee 
that relevant evidence will be preserved by the state and made 
available to challengers, election challenges are not full, fair, or open 
hearings. Therefore, restrictive discovery and evidentiary rules should 
be seen as adding to the procedural burden on plaintiff-voters. 
*** 
The private liberty interest at issue in election challenges is 
weighty, and the potential scope of deprivation encompasses entire 
voting districts. The government interests in continuing burdensome 
procedures like shortened deadlines and extrajudicial decision-making 
are spectacularly unconvincing when considered against a backdrop of  
 
 227. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 
545, 552 (1965)). 
 228. Id. at 345–46. 
 229. Id. at 346. 
 230. See supra notes 155–59 and accompanying text. 
 231. See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text. 
 232. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.  
 233. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 (quoting Armstrong, 380 U.S. at 552). 
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modern-day election failures and public distrust in elections. 
Therefore, just how burdensome a particular procedure is should be 
determined by the extent to which it appears unreliable and unfair, 
when considered in light of traditional due process notions and the 
possible alternatives. 
2. Applying Burdick: Balancing Burdens on the Right to Vote.  As 
discussed above, Burdick explained that equal protection claims 
regarding election law—that is, claims alleging infringements on the 
right to vote—should be analyzed using a balancing test: severe 
burdens on the right to vote “must be narrowly drawn to advance a 
state interest of compelling importance.”234 This strict standard of 
review should replace the deferential treatment that state challenge 
procedures have been receiving in federal court. 
To appropriately calculate the magnitude of a burden on the right 
to vote in electoral due process cases, federal courts should combine 
the procedural burden—determined under Mathews—and any 
evidence the plaintiff can offer that vote deprivation occurred. This 
total burden should be considered severe under a number of fact 
patterns. For instance, where a plaintiff-voter has faced a prohibitively 
unmanageable state challenge process, like that in Louisiana, that 
procedural burden, standing alone, is severe enough to warrant the 
strictest judicial scrutiny—whether or not the plaintiff can offer 
persuasive evidence that an election failure actually occurred. 
Likewise, where a plaintiff has faced a state process that was only 
moderately unfair—perhaps one in which discovery rules and 
deadlines allowed her to adequately investigate, but in which a partisan 
legislative committee rendered an unappealable decision—her burden 
should be considered severe if she can also show persuasive evidence 
that votes were affected. 
Where the tipping point of severity is reached—by whatever 
combination of procedural and actual burdens on the right to vote—
Burdick requires that the state muster a compelling interest in its 
challenged policy. At this stage in the analysis, this “policy” should be 
taken to encompass the election administration itself, the process the 
state offers challengers, and the state’s decision not to remedy the 
alleged vote deprivation. Here, as in the Mathews component of the 
 
 234. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (citing Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 
(1992)). 
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analysis,235 potential state interests in the procedural status quo 
categorically fall short. Because the state “policy” challenged at this 
stage also includes conducting a potentially faulty election, any 
proposed interests feel even less compelling and are certainly less 
narrowly tailored. Therefore, any burden found “severe” under this 
intersectional Mathews-Burdick test should categorically be found to 
fail this version of strict scrutiny. That is, in these electoral due process 
cases, any severe burden—procedural, factual, or a combination 
thereof—on the right to vote should be considered a per se 
constitutional deprivation. Such a deprivation warrants, and indeed 
compels, federal court intrusion into the political thicket for the sake 
of preserving equally representative democracy. 
Federal courts should enjoy flexibility in fashioning remedies to 
these voting rights deprivations. As discussed above, even minimalist 
rulings can incentivize improvement in state election administration 
and challenge procedures. Where a federal court’s finding of a severe 
burden is based more on unfair state challenge procedures than on 
proof of Election Day problems, it might be more appropriate for the 
court to avoid factual issues, declare a state procedure facially 
unconstitutional, and require the state to rehear the plaintiff’s 
challenge. Where the plaintiff’s showing of a severe burden includes 
compelling factual evidence, but perhaps not a patently unfair 
challenge procedure, it might be more appropriate for the federal court 
to rule the election a failure, order a recount or special election, and 
allow the state legislature a chance to amend any unfair procedural 
rules. 
CONCLUSION 
Many state election codes, as they stand now, have the cumulative 
effect of requiring wealth, favor with local political establishments, and 
near omnipotence before a challenger can succeed in obtaining a 
recount or a new election.236 The unforgiving weight of these 
procedures—requirements like two-day filing deadlines,237 twenty-
four-hour appeal deadlines,238 and bars to engaging in discovery239—is 
 
 235. See supra Part III.B.1.b. 
 236. See supra Part I. 
 237. See, e.g., supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 238. See, e.g., supra note 81 and accompanying text.  
 239. See, e.g., supra notes 84–94 and accompanying text (discussing discovery rules for 
election challenges in Louisiana). 
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nearly impossible for all but the most advantaged. The magnitude of 
these procedural burdens is compounded by the reality of this new 
digital age; risks like election malfunctions, software irregularities, and 
foreign interferences are greater now in scope and in probability. This 
seems to be exactly the sort of unfairness, and exactly the sort of threat, 
that federal courts are best suited to address.  
If federal courts exercise greater oversight of state challenge 
procedures to address severe burdens on the right to vote, federalism 
will not be offended, but preserved. Federal courts asking more of state 
procedure is the slightest of intrusions into the political thicket. Finding 
unfairness or vote deprivation more readily would not replace state 
values or state authority with federal. Instead, it would incentivize 
states to innovate—to amend their own laws and to provide their own 
solutions. If anything, demanding more navigable, evenhanded state 
challenge procedures now would forestall even more intrusive federal 
action in the future, such as through updated funding conditions on a 
new HAVA rollout or through further federal investigations of state 
elections.240  
In addition, federal courts have traditionally valued private 
attorneys general—litigants who willingly take on the expense and 
effort of detecting and deterring harmful behavior in order to protect 
the rights of the public through litigation.241 Private litigants who 
voluntarily accept this burden in the face of potential election failures 
should be supported in the doing. States should facilitate, not obstruct, 
the self-funded investigations of private election challengers who could 
sniff out potential software glitches or system breaches and thereby get 
to the truth underlying public doubts in the election system. These 
challengers, after all, have constitutional rights to fully effective votes, 
and these rights extend beyond Election Day to the process of election 
verification and election challenges. If a fair election challenge 
ultimately reveals that the feared election failure did not impact the 
results, then so much the better for public trust in election integrity.  
 
 240. See, e.g., Norris, supra note 23, at 21–22 (suggesting an administrative agency to carry out 
centralized “electoral management” in the United States). 
 241. The D.C. Circuit observed:  
Congress was well aware that “the Nation would have to rely in part upon private 
litigation as a means of securing broad compliance” with Title II [of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964], given the obvious impossibility of the federal Government identifying and 
prosecuting every violation. Indeed, . . . a private party bringing a civil rights suit “does 
so not for himself alone but also as a private attorney general, vindicating a policy that 
Congress considered of the highest priority.” 
Shelby Cty. v. Lynch, 799 F.3d 1173, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). 
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There is valuable transparency to be gained through election 
challenges and electoral due process claims about them. Ensuring that 
challengers are afforded fair hearings will ultimately illuminate where 
state election codes should be changed, when recounts are necessary, 
and how our most precious right can be safeguarded.  
